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THE WHISKEY TAX OF 1791 AND THE 
CONSEQUENT INSURRECTION:
"A WICKED AND HAPPY TUMULT"
Abstract: This paper examines the development of the Whiskey Tax 
of 1791 and its criticality in the funding of early federal government 
debt and operations. By considering some of the provisions of the 
tax and the collection and enforcement procedures, the financial and 
social impacts of the Whiskey Tax are clarified. Civil disobedience in 
resisting the tax and the “Whiskey Rebellion” of 1794 are explored in 
that context. Whether the Whiskey Tax effectively served as the first 
income tax is considered. Images of original record documents are 
included.
INTRODUCTION
Just where he hung the people meet.
To see him swing was music sweet.
A Barrel of whiskey at his feet.1
In March of 1791, the first Congress of the United States 
passed An Act Repealing, after the Last Day of June Next, the Du-
ties Heretofore Laid upon Distilled Spirits Imported from Abroad, 
and Laying Others in their Stead, and Also upon Spirits Distilled 
within the United States and for Appropriating the Same [U.S. 
Senate Journal, February 10, 1791; U.S. Senate, 1911, pp. 338 – 
355]. This law, the “Whiskey Tax,” placed an excise tax on spirits 
1  Poem from anti-excise cartoon by an unknown artist depicting the lynching 
of a revenue agent, 1792, located at the Atwater Kent Museum of Philadelphia 
History.
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distilled in the United States and became the first tax ever levied 
by the United States on a domestic product [review of The De-
bates and Proceedings of the Congress of the U.S….March 3, 1789 
– March 3, 1791].  The excise tax was immediately controversial, 
and resistance developed into the 1794 Whiskey Rebellion, an 
insurrection that has achieved almost mythic status.   
This paper will examine the development and purpose of 
the Whiskey Tax. It will also discuss the distilled spirits opera-
tions in Pennsylvania and neighboring states at the time of the 
tax, the financial impact of the excise, and briefly examine the 
Whiskey Rebellion. An argument will be made that the Whiskey 
Tax, rather than being purely an excise tax, effectively served as 
the country’s first income tax.
TAXATION IN THE 1780S
The post-Revolution U.S. government operated under the 
Articles of Confederation, which granted no power to levy taxes. 
Strapped for the cash needed to pay for the significant expen-
ditures related to the Revolution, the Continental Congress ac-
cepted loans from France. In order to pay off those loans and to 
meet federal expenses, the early government had the choice of 
either printing more money or obtaining other loans. Levying 
taxes was not an option, both due to a lack of legal authority to 
do so and the political caution that balked at alienating the citi-
zens of the fledgling American country who had just gone to war 
with the British over the issue of taxes. Those state governments 
who required their citizens to pay taxes experienced strong, and 
sometimes violent, protests against the administration of taxa-
tion, such as Shay’s Rebellion in Massachusetts [Becker, 1980].
Congress did print money, which led to hyperinflation, and 
interest rates on state and federal debt rose to the dreadful level 
of 5 to 12 percent per month [Penna. Gen. Assembly, 1785]. The 
government struggled to pay off the loans from France, stopping 
payment of interest in 1785, and defaulting on installments due 
in 1787 [U.S. Dept. of State, undated]. The country had also bor-
rowed from the Spanish government and Dutch investors, and 
was in a precarious financial state. Scholars estimate that fed-
eral debt in 1787 exceeded $54 million [Chernow, 2004, p. 297], 
coupled with state debt of $25 million [Anderson, 1983], and 
U.S. Treasury Department data confirm that federal debt was 
well over $75 million by January 1791 [Congress Senate Com-
mittee Report, 1790; U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, undated]. Robert 
Morris, whom George Washington called “the invaluable … 
2
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financier of the Revolution” [Custis and Custis Lee 1861, 328], 
in acknowledgement of the substantial personal credit extended 
on behalf of the patriots, was already headed toward bankruptcy 
and debtor’s prison and had no further means with which to 
help the federal government.
Following the adoption of the Constitution in 1787, its sub-
sequent ratification by eleven states, and the election of George 
Washington as President, the nascent government of the United 
States began operating January 1, 1789, complete with the 
“power to lay and collect taxes” [U.S. Constitution art.1, sec. 8, 
cl. 1]. Edling [2003] argues that the very writing of this Constitu-
tion was a defining moment, creating the American equivalent 
of a European fiscal-military state, with the ability to tax and the 
responsibility to defend its citizens.
The first Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, 
championed a peacetime tax regime based on tariffs and 
tonnage fees2 [Hamilton, 1787]. In its first two sessions, the 
Congress adopted tariffs on a wide variety of imported goods, 
including wine, tea, coffee, hemp, shoes, china and glassware, 
clothing, and hammered or rolled iron [An Act for Laying a Duty 
…, 1789; An Act Imposing Duties …, 1789]. Pelatiah Webster, 
a Philadelphia merchant and economist, argued that those 
customs duties were “voluntary” taxes, since no person was 
“compelled to pay any of the taxes, unless he chooses to be 
concerned in the articles taxed” [Webster, 1791, p. 468], most 
of which were considered luxury goods. Since they were duties 
on articles of consumption, such taxes might affect patterns of 
consumption but did not touch the property of citizens in the 
way a direct tax would, and there was no threat of tax debts or 
foreclosure from such imposts.
 While many are of the opinion that these import tariffs 
were intended to protect the fragile manufacturing industries 
in the new nation, there was substantial debate even at the 
time about whether these tariffs should be for revenue-raising 
purposes alone or to strike back against those countries that 
imposed barriers against U.S. goods [Debates and Proceedings 
of the Congress of the U.S….March 3, 1789 – March 3, 1791]. 
That debate pitted Secretary of the Treasury Hamilton against 
2  The First Session of the 1st Congress passed tariffs on imported goods, pri-
marily those from France and England, and tonnage (weight) fees on cargo navi-
gation superseding those imposed by individual states. James Madison led the 
passage of these acts supported by strong arguments from Hamilton, and then 
“actively promoted” Hamilton’s appointment to head the new Treasury Depart-
ment [Miller, 1960].
3
Krom and Krom: Whiskey tax of 1791 and the consequent insurrection: A Wicked and happy tumult
Published by eGrove, 2013
Accounting Historians Journal, December 201394
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson and his ally James Madi-
son. Hamilton strongly advocated non-discriminatory import 
duties to raise revenue to finance government expenditures 
and fund the public debt, in contrast to Jefferson and Madison 
who sought to impose countervailing restrictions reciprocating 
Britain’s treatment of U.S. goods. Domestic manufacturers were 
disappointed with Hamilton’s proposed moderate tariffs, since 
they were not adequate to discourage imports [Irwin, 2004]. 
Ultimately, the revenue-raising aspect of import duties seems to 
have prevailed. In 1792, one of the few years for which data are 
available, the customs duties collected accounted for about $3.4 
million of the $3.7 million federal government receipts [Nourse, 
1838], indicating the criticality of those duties to support federal 
spending and debt service. 
Despite the substantial tariffs on imported goods, there 
remained a considerable shortfall between income and ex-
penditures. Duties from the first tariff acts consisted of three 
parts: specific duties on 36 particular “luxury” commodities not 
produced in the United States, ad valorem duties on most other 
imports, and duty-free treatment for seventeen goods considered 
necessities such as saltpeter and brass. In order to address the 
revenue shortfall, the specific duties were “fine tuned” almost 
immediately to provide additional income [Irwin, 2003]. The 
Tariff Act of 1790 increased the 1789 duty on wine, tea, coffee, 
and many spices by 50 percent or more, among other adjust-
ments [U.S. Senate, 1911, pp. 330 – 336]. Many duties were 
further raised by the Tariff of 1792 [U.S. Senate, 1911, pp. 355 – 
361], explicitly to fund military expenditures to protect the west-
ern frontier, offering additional support to the revenue-raising 
purpose of import duties.
THE LEVYING OF THE WHISKEY TAX
Despite the additional import duties imposed by the Tar-
iff Act of 1790, a substantial federal deficit remained. Actual 
federal operating and debt expenditures were less than federal 
income, and would have resulted in a government surplus, had 
it not been for the federal assumption of state debts related 
to the revolution [Congress “Assumption Bill,” 1790]. Federal 
expenditures in 1792 amounted to approximately $5.1 million, 
yet government revenue for that year was only $3.7 million [Ir-
win, 2009, p.19], resulting in a deficit of about $1.4 million, or 
27 percent of the federal budget. The U.S. was able to cover its 
revenue shortfall only through a sizeable loan from the Nether-
4
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lands [Riley, 1978]. Interest on the debt alone amounted to more 
than $2.8 million per year [Hamilton, 1790]. With a considerable 
need for additional revenue, Hamilton revisited an idea initially 
broached in his Report Relative to a Provision for the Support of 
Public Credit – the idea of a duty on spirits distilled within the 
United States. Hamilton argued that the monies raised would 
facilitate a properly managed national debt and “render [a na-
tional debt] a national blessing” [Hamilton, 1790].
There are multiple reasons Hamilton targeted distilled spir-
its rather than other domestic products. First, Hamilton [1790] 
argued in his Report … of Public Credit that distilled spirits were 
not a necessity but a luxury item – a “national extravagance” 
– that was only consumed by those who, by logical inference, 
could afford to pay the new tax.  Not only are distilled spirits 
luxury items, Hamilton alleges they are inelastic in demand: 
“Experience has shewn, that luxuries of every kind, lay the 
strongest hold on the attachments of mankind, which, especially 
when confirmed by habit, are not easily alienated from them.” 
Since demand is inelastic, merchants will not suffer as a result 
of the imposition of “considerable duties on such articles,” since 
they will “command a proportional price.” Neither would the 
imposition of a duty thwart the revenue-raising purpose of the 
proposed excise. Since Hamilton anticipated any decrease in 
consumption to be in a small degree, it would not “frustrate the 
expected benefit to the revenue from raising the duties.”
Hamilton and his allies also argued that distilled spirits had 
become a threat to public health. Despite the evident inconsis-
tency between Hamilton’s assertion that liquor is a luxury good, 
and his claims in the same Report … of Public Credit that “The 
consumption of ardent spirits… [is] very much on account of 
their cheapness,” Hamilton presented a letter to Congress from 
the Philadelphia College of Physicians that claimed, “domestic 
distilled spirits, the cheap drink of the laboring classes, had 
become a ravaging plague requiring immediate treatment” [Ho-
geland, 2006, p. 63]. In his Report … of Public Credit, Hamilton 
calls spirits a “pernicious luxury” and a source of national im-
poverishment.  “The consumption of ardent spirits… is carried 
to an extreme, which is truly to be regretted, as well in regard to 
the health and the morals, as to the economy of the communi-
ty.” Consequently, any decrease in consumption of spirits “would 
be, in every respect desirable.” This is in clear contradiction to 
his argument that demand would be inelastic and, therefore, the 
desired additional revenues would be maintained. But this argu-
ment proved to be effective, winning-over the perpetual thorn in 
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his side, James Madison. Madison thought a tax on spirits may 
have useful societal benefits, since it would increase “sobriety 
and thereby prevent disease and untimely deaths” [Madison, 
1981, p. 366].
On top of the argument that distilled spirits are price-inelas-
tic luxury goods, and the seemingly conflicting argument that 
liquor is a cheap and pernicious threat to public health, Ham-
ilton also advocated for the excise tax on the basis that it would 
benefit agriculture by encouraging “the substitution of cyder 
and malt liquors,” with the consequent opening of a “new and 
productive source of revenue” [Hamilton, 1790]. The sugges-
tion that cider and malt liquor would be popular substitutes for 
distilled spirits makes the price-inelasticity argument somewhat 
specious. More questionable, though, is the argument that agri-
culture would benefit from the new duty, since “the excise first 
fell most heavily on the frontier farmers” [Reid, 1979], an effect 
that ultimately manifested in the Whiskey Rebellion.
Whether or not the members of Congress bought Hamilton’s 
convoluted public health, luxury tax, or other explanations (and 
many of them did), they really had no other option but to sign 
off on the revenue bill that instituted the federal excise. The 
United States had a legal obligation to pay back debts to lenders 
who had bought bonds during the American Revolution. The 
only way to meet these debts was either to impose an excise 
tax or to resort to even more unpopular direct measures like a 
land tax, an income tax, or a wealth tax3 [Hogeland, 2006, p. 
63]. Madison brought considerable support to the excise tax on 
domestic spirits, insisting, “as direct taxes would be still more 
generally obnoxious and as imports are already loaded as far as 
they will bear, an excise is the only resource and of all articles 
distilled spirits are least objectionable” [Madison, 1981, p. 344].
It was on this foundation that Congress passed, in early 
1791, An Act Repealing, after the Last Day of June Next, the Duties 
Heretofore Laid upon Distilled Spirits Imported from Abroad, and 
Laying Others in their Stead, and Also upon Spirits Distilled with-
in the United States and for Appropriating the Same [U.S. Senate 
Journal, February 10, 1791; U.S. Senate, 1911, pp. 338 – 355]. 
This Whiskey Tax act (the Act) passed in the House on January 
3  “Direct” taxes are those paid directly by an individual to the taxing entity, 
such as a real estate or income tax. Indirect taxes, such as sales taxes, may be 
shifted to an intermediate entity. Tariffs are duties on imported goods, while an 
excise tax is on goods produced within the borders.
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27, 1791, by a vote of 35 yeas to 21 nays, passed the Senate on 
February 12, 1791, by a vote of 20 to 5, and was signed by the 
President on March 3, 1791 [U.S. Senate, 1911, pp. 337 – 338]. 
In both the House and the Senate, Pennsylvania delegate votes 
were split equally, giving no hint of the trouble to come.
The duties on distilled spirits were quite costly. Most ex-
pensive were the taxes on liquors distilled domestically from 
imported molasses and sugar, primarily rum. Those “more than 
40 per cent above proof,” were taxed at 30 cents per gallon. Be-
tween 20 and 40 percent above proof the taxes were 20 cents per 
gallon, with decreases in the tax commensurate with reduced 
alcohol level down to those spirits “more than 10 per cent below 
proof,” which bore a tax of 11 cents per gallon. Spirits distilled 
domestically from local crops benefited from a slightly lower tax 
burden, ranging from 25 cents per gallon for 40 per cent above 
proof to 9 cents per gallon for the lowest proof products. At a 
time when the average wage was less than twenty-five cents per 
day for the small number of people who earned actual wages 
(David and Solar, 1977), the tax on spirits amounted to as much 
as a full day’s wages per gallon.
DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT OF THE WHISKEY TAX
The tax on whiskey was particularly economically burden-
some to the people of the western frontier. In the early 1790s, 
the United States could not come to an agreement with Spain 
to open the Mississippi River to trade, and thus the Mississippi 
River remained closed to American shipping. “The Mississippi 
problem robbed westerners of chances for the small-scale com-
mercial development through which they longed to free them-
selves from depression, barter economies, and dependency on 
landlords and creditors” [Hogeland, 2006, p. 56]. Without the 
use of the Mississippi for easy shipping, the farmers of western 
Pennsylvania were forced to turn their grain into whiskey. The 
substantial reduction in volume resulting from the distillation 
of grain into whiskey greatly reduced the cost to transport their 
crops to the populous east coast – the only place where there 
were markets for their crops. More than one fourth of the whis-
key stills in the United States were located at the forks of the 
Ohio River in western Pennsylvania [Hogeland, 2006, p. 70], and 
those families were hit the hardest by the Whiskey Excise tax.
The farmers at the western frontier were disproportionately 
likely to sell their crops as alcohol rather than grain, so were 
more likely to have to pay the new excise tax. Additionally, the 
7
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transportation costs per gallon were much higher for those 
farmers at the frontier, so the per-gallon profit was reduced 
disproportionately by the per-gallon tax. This was a tax on distil-
lation, not on consumption, so the tax was borne by the farmer 
not by the customer. As a result, the Whiskey Excise taxed rural 
frontier farmers unfairly compared to those who lived in more 
convenient places where they were closer to an eastern commer-
cial center.
The fact that this was a tax on distillation created other 
problems. Section 17 of the Act required that the duties be paid 
before the liquor was removed from the distillery, with a tax 
abatement of 2 cents for every 10 gallons. 
FIGURE 1
Receipt for Payment of $23.10 in Excise Tax on Stills June – 
August, 1795. Receipt signed by Tax Inspector John Hughes 
(Pennsylvania 3rd Survey District).
Source: Tax receipts records at National Archives.
For those distillers who were unable to make the payment, a 
three-month surety bond4 was an option. 
Anyone caught with a cask of spirits for which the tax cer-
tificate could not be produced were subject to seizure and for-
feiture, not only of the casks, but also of their horses or cattle, 
carts, harness, tackle, and any other vessels or boats that may be 
in use. As such, the farmers had to pay the taxes prior to taking 
their goods to market or risk losing everything. Section 21 of the 
Act also imposed an annual tax on stills of 60 cents per gallon of 
4  Given the economic conditions at the time, these bonds are likely to have 
borne a very high interest rate, but no contemporaneous data were found.
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capacity. The still duty was to be paid “half yearly,” in January 
and July. Non-payment could result in forfeiture and sale of all 
personal goods. 
FIGURE 2
Image of a "Promise to Pay" Tax Inspector John Hughes 
(Pennsylvania 3rd Survey District) an outstanding debt for 
$64.15 in whiskey taxes dated August 2, 1797, and signed by 
Joseph Stevenson in the presence of witnesses Christian Riddle 
and James Mitchel.
Source: Tax receipts records at National Archives.
In addition to the onerous taxes were burdensome record-
keeping requirements. Sections 24 and 35 mandate a daily log 
book, or accounts book, indicating the quantity of spirits dis-
tilled, the quantity sold, and inventory on hand. For uneducated, 
often illiterate, frontier farmers, record keeping was an arduous, 
if not impossible, task. Failure to keep the daily record, whether 
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through negligence or refusal, carried a penalty of $100 [Section 
35]. Detailed requirements for signage and public notice were 
also specified. 
FIGURE 3
Image of a Still Tax Certificate granted to James Mitchell dated 
January 2, 1802, licensing him to operate two stills. Signed by 
Peter Muhlenberg, Supervisor of the Revenue for the District of 
Pennsylvania.
Source: Tax receipts records at National Archives.
A number of sections describe the powers of inspecting of-
ficers, including their right to enter any relevant building and 
inspect at all times in the daytime, and the right to sample or 
taste any goods. Penalties for using mismarked casks, or defac-
ing inspector’s marks on casks, were very high at $100 per cask 
[Sections 30 and 31]. Counterfeit or altered certificates carried a 
penalty of $500 per certificate [Section 45].  
The Whiskey Excise had a disparate impact on the poorest 
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people of western Pennsylvania who used whiskey as a com-
modity with which to barter. The people of the frontier were 
cash-poor “accomplished monetary innovators” [Sylla, 2006, 
p. 76] who relied on whiskey as a means of payment – labor-
ers usually were paid in a portion of the grain they harvested 
and landlords took whiskey as rent payment. Indeed, many of 
the families on the frontier would never see cash money in the 
course of a decade [Bouton, 2007], relying completely on a bar-
ter and subsistence economy.  Barter was the tool that kept rural 
people free of debt and dependency [Hogeland, 2006, p. 67]. 
Even in more developed regions of Pennsylvania there was “an 
extreme scarcity of circulating specie” causing farmers to sign 
petitions and condemn state officials [Carlisle Gazette, 1788, p. 1; 
York County Petition, 1784]. In Pennsylvania, a dominant part 
of the post-Revolution experience was a “profound scarcity of 
money and credit,” resulting in property foreclosure, unpaid pri-
vate debts and public taxes, and the misery of losing everything 
one owned including mattresses, mugs, and spoons as well as 
the items needed to make a living [Bouton, 2000]. By 1790, the 
circulation of money had dropped to only 31 cents per person, 
in contrast to the $5.33 per person during the “currency short-
age” of the Revolutionary War [State of the Finances…, 1790].
Despite the critical shortage of cash, and the prevalence of 
the barter economy particularly in rural areas, whiskey could 
not be tendered in payment of the excise tax – it was required 
to be paid in cash, which was an inconceivable hardship [Hoge-
land, 2006, p. 68]. “Without money, or the means of procuring 
it, consuming their whiskey only in their families or using it as 
a system of barter, which, though in some respects answered the 
place of money, yet would not be received in pay for the excise 
tax, they thought it hard to pay as much tax on what sold with 
them but at from two shillings and six pence, as they did where 
it brought double that price” [Findlay, 1985, p. 79]. Thus, the 
Whiskey Tax was not the “mere luxury-tax-with-concomitant-
health-benefit” that Hamilton presented to Congress. The de-
mand for cash payment seems to contradict Hamilton’s [1787] 
own declaration that the ability of citizens to pay taxes “must al-
ways be proportioned…to the quantity of money in circulation, 
and the celerity with which it circulates.”
By taxing the only feasible source of income for frontier 
families the Whiskey Excise Tax may have effectively functioned 
as the nation’s first income tax. Compounding the effect of the 
Whiskey Tax was the actual experience of taxation, which was 
unfamiliar to Pennsylvanians. Unlike people in other states, 
11
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“Pennsylvanians were unused to paying taxes, as the state had 
hitherto financed itself almost exclusively through land sales” 
[Edling, 2003]. This onerous taxation of farmers in western 
Pennsylvania stands in clear contrast to the preferential tax 
treatment received by farmers since the passage of the Revenue 
Act of 1913 imposing the federal income tax [Barney and Flesh-
er, 2008]. Likewise, the disparate effect of this tax on poor fron-
tier farmers violated the arguments advanced in the 19th century 
suggesting that an income tax was the most equitable form of 
taxation, since an income tax “does not impinge upon the limit 
of subsistence of those possessing but small incomes, as do the 
customs and excise taxes” [Howe, 1894]. Thus, the Whiskey Ex-
cise Tax “redistributed wealth by working itself deeply into rural 
people’s peculiar economic relationship with whiskey” [Hoge-
land, 2006, p. 64].
Hugh Henry Brackenridge, a first-hand observer of the 
impact and consequences of the Whiskey Excise Tax, noted 
that the worst element of the federal excise was its method of 
enforcement. Delinquent distillers who could not pay the federal 
tax collectors were given trials – a fact that Hamilton used to 
convince Congress that this tax was not like classic excises that 
had infringed liberties. However, these trials were not conducted 
in local courts but in the federal court in Philadelphia, which is 
about three hundred miles from the homes and farms of west-
ern Pennsylvanians. Distillers who could not pay the cash excise 
would be compelled to travel to Philadelphia at the sacrifice of 
their farms and the ruin of their families [Slaughter, 1986]. The 
trip to Philadelphia was long and arduous. The expense of the 
trip was nearly equal to the value of their homesteads [Brack-
enridge, 1859, p. 67], and the families left behind at the frontier 
were exposed to many dangers including Indian invasion. Since 
one of the grievances in the Declaration of Independence was 
that England took persons “beyond Seas” for trial, the require-
ment of travel to Philadelphia likewise added insult to injury. 
GENERAL NEVILLE, THE INDIAN PROBLEM, AND 
WESTYLVANIA
In the spring of 1791, General John Neville was appointed 
to enforce and collect the Whiskey Tax in western Pennsylvania. 
Neville was an ambitious, wealthy large-scale distiller. He 
was an English Episcopalian from Virginia in an area of western 
Pennsylvania where the vast majority of residents were Scots-
Irish or German Presbyterians and Quakers. He and his Virgin-
12
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ian aristocratic wife, Winifred Oldham, built their mansion on 
top of a hill on ten thousand acres in western Pennsylvania, 
calling it Bower Hill. It was “the fanciest home in that part of 
the west” and one of the only homes that was large and wealthy 
enough to own slaves (and not Quaker) [Hogeland, 2006, p. 99].
FIGURE 4
Cover of "Abstract of duties arising on Country Stills employed 
in distilling spirits from domestic materials under the 
management of John Neville, Inspector of the 4th Survey dist. 
of Pennsylvania. Year ending 30 June 1794." The notation 
for the five divisions within the 4th district (most of western 
Pennsylvania) indicates $39,379.12 in whiskey tax was collected 
during the year..
Source: Tax receipts records at National Archives.
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FIGURE 5
Inside summary of "Abstract of duties arising on Country Stills 
employed in distilling spirits from domestic materials under 
the management of John Nevill for the fourth Survey in the 
District of Pennsylvania, commencing July the 1st, 1793 and 
ending June the 30th 1794." The notation for the five divisions 
within the 4th district (most of western Pennsylvania) indicates 
$40,056.12 in whiskey tax was collected during the year, in 
contrast to the document in Figure 4 covering the same time 
period and same geographic area.
Source: Tax receipts records at National Archives.
The “Neville Connection” was General Neville’s family 
business – a conglomerate of industrial, mercantile, and social 
interests with business centered in Pittsburgh. The Neville Con-
nection worked in conjunction with other powerful families of 
the area to run ironworks and boatyards, broker deals, and grow 
grain on large plots of land. The Neville Connection essentially 
monopolized any business with which it was interested.
Pittsburgh was staging area for military expeditions against 
the Indians in 1791 and 1792. The Neville Connection seized 
the new market for food, drink, and supplies that had landed 
in its lap, and largely dominated buying and selling at the army 
garrison [Hogeland, 2006, p. 101]. Whiskey was one of the most 
essential products to supply to an army, and Neville leaped at 
the chance to sell his whiskey to the army at a high cost. As the 
excise tax collector, Neville strictly enforced the Whiskey Excise 
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to make sure that no illegal whiskey from smaller distilleries 
got into the hands of the army, benefiting his personal business 
interests as well as following orders from Washington. In ad-
dition to dominating the whiskey-supply market in Pittsburgh, 
the Act specified that Neville collected a $450 annual salary and 
a 1% commission from all of the taxes he collected from his 
neighbors. It is easy to understand, then, why Neville was not 
well-liked by small-scale whiskey distillers. Aside from the fact 
that he was the enforcer of the dreaded Whiskey Excise, he was 
also a shrewd businessman who used his power and influence 
to sure-up permanent markets and to push out small-scale busi-
nesses from the Pittsburgh area. 
While the appointment of General Neville was a vexa-
tion, the “Indian Problem” helped propel the frontiersmen to 
insurrection. The settlers of western Pennsylvania had ongo-
ing interactions with the Indians of the region, most of which 
were bloody and violent on both sides. “An afternoon trip to 
church or town could become a scene of butchery. At night a 
cabin could be abruptly filled with whooping warriors, swing-
ing children by their feet to open their skulls, slicing limbs and 
taking scalps, disappearing into the woods with wailing cap-
tives” [Hogeland, 2006, p. 56]. England supported these western 
Indian tribes and amplified the harassment of the American 
settlers5 [Anonymous, 1847, Chapter XI].  The people of western 
Pennsylvania looked to the federal and state governments to as-
sist them in keeping the Indians at bay, but neither government 
seemed concerned with the plight of the rural frontier settlers, 
partly because these same rural settlers rarely voted [Hogeland, 
2006, p. 54]. Additionally, Virginia and Pennsylvania constantly 
fought over who owned the western territory – both tried to 
collect taxes and issued competing land titles to former squat-
ters and absentee speculators [Barksdale, 2003]. “Having two 
governments was tantamount to having none,” and the region of 
western Pennsylvania went largely without government through-
out the late-eighteenth century [Hogeland, 2006, p. 15].
As a response to the lack of government aid or attention, 
many settlers in western Pennsylvania began to talk of a single 
independent western state, which they called “Westylvania,” de-
5  The Proclamation of 1763, in which England prohibited colonists from set-
tling further west than the Appalachian Mountains, drew many Delaware Indians 
in Ohio to side with the British during the Revolutionary War. These “British 
Indians” feared (correctly) that they would have to relinquish their land due to 
western expansion if the Colonists won [Hurt, 1996].
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spite a state law that made it a capital crime to discuss indepen-
dence. Though illegal, in western Pennsylvania, and particularly 
in Washington County, citizens held meetings about the Westyl-
vania movement and created committees of correspondence to 
communicate with settlers in Kentucky and western Virginia 
who would also make up the state of Westylvania. Kentucky 
even held a convention to discuss Westylvania in response to a 
circular letter out of the western Pennsylvania meeting [Slaugh-
ter, 1986].
INSURRECTION
Talk of secession added to the rural insurgency activities in 
post-Revolution Pennsylvania. Beginning in 1787, on at least 62 
occasions, Pennsylvania farmers created formidable obstruc-
tions making roads impassable for many months at a time [Bou-
ton, 2000, p. 855]. The passage of the excise tax brought im-
mediate protests, with a fierce anti-excise meeting held in July 
1791 in Brownsville, Pennsylvania, led by Colonel Edward Cook 
and Albert Gallatin. That meeting resulted in the publication of 
a set of “resolutions expressing the sense of their constituents on 
the subject of the excise law” in the Pittsburgh Gazette [Bracken-
ridge, 1859, pp. 22 – 23]. Formal anti-excise conventions were 
held in Pittsburgh in September 1791 and again in July 1794, 
resulting in a petition in the form of a circular letter and general 
address to the neighboring counties in Pennsylvania. This circu-
lar letter was part English/colonial rhetoric on infringement of 
liberty and part full of new “western”/frontier rhetoric insisting 
that the excise tax favored the rich and hit westerners hardest. 
Peaceful protest was paralleled by a series of violent acts. In 
September 1791 the excise officer for Washington and Allegheny 
counties, Robert Johnson, was tarred and feathered6 and left for 
dead [Clouse, 1991, pp. 27 – 28]. In August of 1792, Captain Wil-
liam Faulker was attacked because he had allowed his house to 
serve as an office of inspection for the Inspector of Revenue in 
Washington County [Hamilton, 1792]. In April 1793 the home 
of Fayette County excise officer Benjamin Wells was burned (he 
was also tarred and feathered that fall), followed by the June 
tarring and feathering of John Lynn, deputy Westmoreland 
6  While often discounted as merely a form of public humiliation, this practice 
could have dire consequences. The victim was either dunked in hot tar or pine 
pitch, or had it poured/painted over him, and was then rolled in feathers. This re-
sulted in burns over most of the body, and removal of the tar ripped skin and often 
required the use of kerosene or turpentine. Infrequently, death from overheating 
or ensuing infection could occur [The Effects of Varnishing the Skin, 1877].
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County excise officer [Brackenridge, 1859, pp. 28 – 30]. Mob 
violence extended into neighboring counties in Virginia (modern 
West Virginia), including a siege in Morgantown, which briefly 
became the national fulcrum for anti-excise tax activity [Barks-
dale, 2003, p. 8].
In a particularly unfortunate incident in October 1791, a 
mob attacked Robert Wilson, an obviously cognitively disabled 
man (Alexander Hamilton calls him “an unhappy man” who was 
“manifestly disordered in his intellects”) who had made inqui-
ries about the various whiskey stills in town [Hamilton, 1794, p. 
35]. It seems that Wilson imagined himself to be a clandestine 
agent sent to recover information for the Treasury Department, 
but he was not a spy nor was he connected with the govern-
ment in any way. Unfortunately, Wilson’s imaginary position as 
government auditor fooled the people of western Pennsylvania, 
and he became the target of an attack carried-out by a black-
faced gang. They took Wilson out of his bed and marched him 
five miles away to a blacksmith’s shop, where they stripped him 
naked and prodded him with the blacksmith’s hot iron, which 
burned him in several places, before they tarred and feathered 
him [Hamilton, 1794, p. 35]. Sadly, Wilson’s dedication to his 
imaginary position was such that he refused to renounce the tax 
or ask for mercy “no matter how horrific the pain” [Hogeland, 
2006, p. 104]. Because Wilson was not actually affiliated with 
the government, despite his willingness to die for their cause, 
he had no one to take his grievances to or to report this harass-
ment to. Alexander Hamilton used the attack on “the unhappy 
sufferer” as proof that Daniel Hamilton’s gang was ruthless and 
was willing to target even those who were not affiliated with the 
excise. However, it is clear that the mob of frontiersmen were 
convinced that Wilson was involved with the government and 
were not just randomly harassing innocent men.
A dramatic meeting was held at Mingo Creek in July 1794, 
with Major General David Bradford rising to lead the incensed 
farmers. The Mingo Creek Association and the local militias 
demonstrated the new nature of their “mob” – large, organized, 
armed, and militant. The Mingo Creek Association and their 
militias numbered 600 rebels in a formal muster at the Bower 
Hill manor of General Neville, “Chief Inspector of the Revenue” 
[Brackenridge, 1859, pp. 46 – 49]. “No blackface now, no wild 
disguise. This wouldn’t be a raid by a gang but an expedition 
by a large, disciplined fighting force, mobilized without order 
from any legal authority, offering to do battle with a division of 
the U.S. Army” [Hogeland, 2006, p. 151]. The battle at Bower 
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Hill was not a small act of mob violence but an all-out war. Both 
sides opened fire in earnest; gunfire raged at Bower Hill and 
the ad-hoc army of rebels made a massive bonfire of General 
Neville’s furniture and belongings (igniting it, ironically, with 
the General’s whiskey). There was only one casualty of the battle 
at Bower Hill – Captain James McFarlane, a local hero of the 
American Revolution militia who served as the leader of the 
Whiskey Rebels’ Bower Hill operation. McFarlane was probably 
shot accidentally when he came out from behind a tree [Hoge-
land, 2006, p. 151 – 154]. 
 Not all still owners embraced the burgeoning violence. 
Drawing attention to those not joining the “expedition against 
that insolent exciseman John Neville”, “Tom the Tinker” placed 
a series of advertisements in The Pittsburgh Gazette and other 
newspapers. Though his true identity is subject to debate, Tom 
the Tinker specifically named John Reed of Washington (PA) 
who “came not forth in the suppression of the execution of said 
law.” The advertisements threatened that non-supporters “will 
be deemed as enemies” and threatened “punishment according 
to the nature of the offence” [Tom the Tinker, 1794].
A few weeks later, in August, 1794, delegates from Pennsyl-
vania and West Virginia held a large gathering at the Jean Bon-
net Tavern, near modern Bedford, Pennsylvania, and erected a 
large liberty pole inscribed “Liberty and no Excise! No Asylum 
for Traitors and Cowards!” Lead by Albert Gallatin, Edward 
Cook, and Hugh Henry Brakenridge, this gathering had two 
principal objectives – to organize tax resistance and to draft a 
definitive anti-tax declaration [Brackenridge, 1859, pp. 157 – 
172]. By the end of August, “western Pennsylvania’s Whiskey 
Rebels had their own flags, their own army, and their own mar-
tyr: Captain James McFarlane” [Barcousky, 2008].
THE “WATERMELON ARMY” OR “ARMY OF THE WESTERN 
EXPEDITION”
Initially, national leaders generally presented the protests 
to the Whiskey Excise as “exaggerated responses to so incon-
sequential a tax on whiskey” [Slaughter, 1985, p. 10] and “in-
temperate” [Brackenridge, 1859, p. 263]. Those who took issue 
with the excise were considered to reflect the “paranoid style 
affecting politics at the time” [Slaughter, 1985, p. 10]. Although 
economic principles mattered to the people of western Pennsyl-
vania, the tax itself was almost definitely not enough to incite 
violence. According to Hugh Henry Brackenridge, a first-hand 
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observer, “The major cause of violence resistance had nothing 
directly to do with the excise tax itself” [Brackenridge, 1859, p. 
30] but was primarily due to the horrible penalties imposed for 
non-payment and the unavailability of the currency required to 
make the payments.
By the end of summer in 1794, however, the extent of the 
rebellion required serious attention. Alexander Hamilton pub-
lished, under the name “Tully,” a series of letters denouncing the 
insurgents as enemies to the Constitution and to all orderly gov-
ernment [Hamilton Works]. Finally, President Washington called 
out the troops, stating that he would not permit “a small portion 
of the United States [to] dictate to the whole union” [Washing-
ton, 1794]. Nearly 13,000 soldiers – infantry, cavalry, and artil-
lery – assembled to quell the rebellion [Baldwin, 1939, p. 225]. 
Remarkably, troops from each participating state were led by 
their state governor: Governor Mifflin (PA), Governor Henry Lee 
(VA), Governor Thomas Lee (MD), and Governor Howell (NJ). 
Even more extraordinarily, Washington himself commanded the 
army, widely considered the singular instance in which a sitting 
President of the United States led troops into battle. Whether 
due to the “rough conditions,” as some critics claim, or to judi-
cious politics, as other historians assert, Washington turned 
back after rallying the troops in Bedford, Pennsylvania (at or 
near the aforementioned Jean Bonnet Tavern) [Baldwin, 1939, 
p. 229].
Horrible torrential downpours slowed the army, allowing 
time for the rebellion leaders to consider their response. Ulti-
mately, cooler heads prevailed, and the bloodshed was minimal. 
“There was no resistance, either to the military or civil author-
ity” [Brackenridge, 1859, p. 312]. However, hundreds of rebels 
were arrested, and generally treated poorly despite the amnesty 
that was promised. Accounts of the prisoners taken at Mingo 
Creek included placement in a cold, wet basement with neither 
food nor drink, followed by a twelve-mile march [Brackenridge, 
1859, p. 320 – 321]. Most prisoners were eventually released by 
General Lee, acting under the President’s authority, despite their 
participation in the “wicked and unhappy tumults and distur-
bances lately existing” [Lee, 1794], but about twenty key players 
were subjected to military tribunals. Several men were sen-
tenced to hang, although President Washington first reprieved, 
and then pardoned them [Baldwin, 1939, pp. 257 – 264], with 
the exception of the prominent leader Daniel Bradford. Brad-
ford escaped to Spanish-controlled New Orleans, but was 
pardoned by President John Adams in March 1799 [Hoover, un-
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dated]. Several thousand men were temporarily exiled to lands 
farther west, where many chose to make a permanent residence.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the Whiskey Insurrection failed, but manifested 
long coattails. Other economic forces, primarily the growth of 
large distillers, doomed the small distiller, many of whom pulled 
up their roots and headed to Kentucky and Tennessee (hotbeds 
of whiskey distilling even today). However, commerce and in-
dustry in western Pennsylvania grew dramatically, in part due 
to the presence of the army and the currency it injected into cir-
culation. Within the decade, the Pittsburgh area was “launched 
on a course that was eventually to make it the ‘workshop of the 
world’” [Baldwin, 1939, p. 265]. 
Likewise, the insurrection gave support to Federalist calls 
for a standing army of the U.S., and probably influenced the 
elections of 1794 and 1796 at the very least. The Federalists 
controlled the White House and most of Congress through the 
presidencies of George Washington (1789 – 1797) and John 
Adams (1797 – 1801), during which excise taxes were limited 
“almost exclusively to goods and services consumed by the af-
fluent” [Brownlee, 2006, p. 7], including wines, distilled spirits, 
sugar, carriages,  vellum, parchment and paper. The Whiskey 
Tax became a critical issue in the tight presidential election of 
1800, when Thomas Jefferson tied Aaron Burr in the Electoral 
College [Tally of the Electoral Votes…, 1801] and only won in the 
House of Representatives after 36 ballots over 6 days [Jefferson 
Victorious, 2010]. At the time of the election, it was conventional 
wisdom that “’the whisky drinkers’ had made Jefferson presi-
dent” [Simon, 2012]. The Whiskey Tax and all other internal 
taxes were repealed on April 6, 1802 after Thomas Jefferson 
took office as president [U.S. Senate Journal, 1802]. Jefferson’s 
signature also abolished all tax collection offices and the Su-
pervisor of the Internal Revenue [An Act to Repeal the Internal 
Taxes, 1802], making it understandably popular. 
As the first tax on a domestically produced product, the 
Whiskey Excise was an important development in the financing 
of the debt and operations of the federal government. Though 
officially an excise on distillation, for the vast majority of fron-
tier farmers it effectively served as a tax on their only source 
of income, particularly as payment in coin was required. An 
argument can surely be made that the Whiskey Excise may have 
effectively functioned as the first U.S. direct income tax, more 
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than a half-century before the formal income tax briefly enacted 
to finance the Civil War. The events surrounding the Whiskey 
Excise Tax also presaged the social cleavage between the new 
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